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1. Introduction 
The U.S. financial markets have been one of the best locations in the world to conduct 
business. However, dubious accounting procedures lead by the Enron and WorldCom 
debacles have brought about significant governance changes in the U.S. markets in the early 
21
st century. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sox) was passed by Congress in 2002 to raise the 
level of governance and transparency within the U.S. framework. After the imposition of 
Sox, the U.S. still ranks highly in terms of international exchanges. According to Table 1, 
the U.S. markets in 2006 ranked first and second in terms of total share trading value.
1 
Since the imposition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act tightening corporate accounting and 
governance requirements, some foreign companies may have shied away from the United 
States capital markets. Additionally, foreign companies currently listed in the United States 
could delist voluntarily if they believed the additional costs added on via Sox compliance 
outweigh the benefits of cross-listing.
2 Back in 1996, there was a spike in new ADRs 
(American Depositary Receipts)
3 cross-listings and U.S. listings, coinciding with the peak 
of the booming Initial Public Offerings (IPO) market. In that year, the annual number of 
new Level II and Level III ADR cross-listings reached its peak, but by 2000, new ADR 
cross-listings significantly decreased. In addition, new Level II and III ADR cross-listings 
in 2004 and 2005 were at their lowest level since 1992. An adjustment period after the 
thriving and widely successful 90’s would be expected, but a noticeable shift occurred in 
2002. The number of ADR de-listings began to increase while the number of domestic de-
listings began to level off and actually fell in 2005.
4  
    In this paper, we are interested in the effects of the Sarbanes Oxley act on 
worldwide capital markets. In particular, whether or not Sox had an effect on the market 
                                                 
1 However, from 2005 to 2006, the US was unable to raise as much investment capital as other markets, 
e.g. World Federation Exchange 2006 Annual Report 
 
2 A study reported in The Economist, 2005 found that the overall cost of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance in 
fiscal year 2004-05 was $1.4 trillion. 
 
3 The ADR program permits individuals in US markets to invest in non-US firms in US dollar-
denominated receipts redeemable by specialized US financial institutions (Depositaries) in the 
underlying shares. 
 
4 See www.adr.com for information on new listings and de-listing ratios.   2
value of firms; whether or not Sox had an effect on cross-listings worldwide; and whether 
or not Sox had a contagion effect on firm value and a substitution versus contagion effect on 
cross-listings world-wide. Sox could eventually have had an impact on the market value of 
firms through the increased cost of compliance. Since the cost is incurred in the US market, 
a significant effect in other international markets would lead to a contagion effect on the 
value of firms. In addition, the impact of Sox on firm value could eventually decrease the 
number of listings in the U.S. thus leading to a substitution effect in which those foreign 
companies tended to cross-list in other international markets. The alternative would be a 
contagion effect on cross-listings in which Sox could have an adverse effect on cross-
listings in foreign markets. On the other hand, the benefits of cross-listing, mainly from the 
perspective of signaling and corporate governance standards could outweigh the costs and a 
potential crowding in of listings could be possible in the country where standards are raised. 
In this latter case, we would expect that with higher financial reporting standards and more 
stringent corporate governance, firms willing to abide by those rules and regulations face 
additional costs to listing in the U.S. and thus would command a higher premium for cross-
listing in the U.S.  
    Based on a WorldScope panel data set which includes 49,416 firm’s valuations 
over a six year period of time, from 2000 to 2005, spanning 31 countries, we present 
empirical evidence on the effect of Sox on firm value, controlling for cross-listing in the US, 
Germany, and Hong Kong destinations; thus representing three major geographic 
destinations: North America, Asia and Europe. We use simple univariate methods, dynamic 
panel methods and treatment effects methods and find that Sarbanes-Oxley (Sox) has had a 
consistent negative impact on the market value of firms in this period. The evidence from 
differences in means is that, in Hong Kong, the cross-listing premium is consistently 
negative in 2000-2005, in Germany it becomes negative after 2001 and in the US after 2004. 
The dynamic panels show that Honk Kong commands a significant discount on the value of 
a firm cross-listing there, relative to firms that do not cross-list there. However, we do not 
identify a cross-listing premium in the US or Germany destination in this sample. The 
evidence from treatment effects confirms that Sarbanes-Oxley impacted negatively on the 
value of firms. However, the effect of Sox on the cross-listing decision is positive in the US   3
destination and negative on the Germany destination; and the Hong Kong destination seems 
to attract cross-listing of firms with lower valuations relative to the US and Germany 
destination. In terms of the cross-listing decision, the evidence is in favor of crowding-in the 
market where the accounting standards are better, lending support to the signaling and 
corporate governance hypotheses for cross-listing choice. There seems to be widespread 
contagion of Sox on the value of firms worldwide, controlling for several other factors. 
However, even though the effect of Sox on the US destination is positive, we cannot 
identify a positive cross-listing premium in the US, whereas we find negative premiums in 
Hong Kong and Germany. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, compare the costs and institutional arrangements of cross-listing in the 
U.S., Hong Kong, and Germany and review the literature. Section 4 describes the data while 
section 5 presents the main empirical results. The last section offers concluding remarks.   
2. International Listings and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Firms’ tend cross-list abroad for four common reasons.
5 Market segmentation allows 
investors to escape cross-border barriers to investment. Liquidity effects reduce costs in 
then sense that the greater liquidity the lower the spreads. The information or signaling 
hypothesis is based on the premise that cross-listing signals market participants about the 
financial health of the firm. Finally, the corporate governance hypothesis or "bonding" 
assumes that firms, whom domestically have poor governance standards, often list their 
securities on countries with more rigorous governance procedures.
6  
                                                 
5 Karolyi (1998, 2005) conducted a thorough review of the cross-listing literature, and Bianconi and 
Tan (2008) describe those reasons in detail. 
 
6 For the information hypothesis, see Cantale (1996), Fuerst (1998), Moel (1999), Baker, Nofsinger and 
Weaver (2002), Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) and Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2005). For the corporate 
governance hypothesis, see Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) 
and Doidge (2004).   4
2.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sox) was passed in July 2002 with the main goal of protecting 
investor interests. The Act first established the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB), which works together with the SEC to oversee auditors of public 
companies. The PCAOB operates under the same jurisdiction as the SEC and has the 
authority to discipline violators of the Act and impose penalties. It sets out guidelines 
separating board members from public accounting firms, and defines auditing, quality 
control, independence standards and rules, and disciplinary actions and procedures.
7  
    In terms of compliance, Sox applies to firms that
8: i. Have securities registered 
under section 12 of the Exchange Act; ii. Are required to file reports under section 15d of 
the Exchange Act; iii. File or have filed a registration statement that has not yet become 
effective under the Securities Act of 1933 and that they have not been removed. Because 
Sox does not distinguish between U.S. and non-U.S. firms, and does not exempt non-U.S 
firms from its effects, the provisions that apply to U.S. firms also apply to non-U.S. firms 
unless they are specifically excluded by a related provision of the Exchange Act or the 
Securities Act.  
    The Sox allows the SEC to determine where and how to apply its provisions to 
non-U.S. firms. Certain provisions in the Securities Act and Exchange Act do mandate 
different treatment for different levels of ADR firms. As shown in Table 2, Level I ADRs 
                                                 
7 Section two of the act states the functions of auditors and clarifies their independence from their 
clients. Subsection 201 details which functions cannot be performed by public accounting firms 
together with an audit in order to prevent conflicts of interest in firm accounting. Other sections outline 
audit partner rotations, accounting firm reporting procedures, and executive officer independence. 
Section three defines corporate responsibility. It creates public company audit committees consisting of 
board members who cannot receive remittance outside of service on the board; declares that executive 
officers must accompany their financial statements with a protestation certifying accuracy with failure 
to include this document must be knowing and intentional to ensure liability; gives federal courts the 
authority to penalize executives who attempt to change financial statements by granting any favors to 
investors. Section four explains disclosure and internal audit procedures. It prohibits loans to 
executives and presents a timeline for disclosure of executive/owner transactions. The remainder of the 
Act outlines SEC responsibilities including minimum standards for practicing attorneys, essentials for 
conducting studies, an increase in monetary resources for implementation of the Act, authority to 
freeze payments, extension of whistleblower protections, and enhancement of white-collar fraud 
penalties. See USGAO, 2006. 
 
8 As defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).   5
are required to comply with criminal and whistleblower provisions of Sox; Level IV ADRs 
are required to comply with criminal provisions of Sox only. Both Level II and Level III 
ADRs must comply fully with all provisions of Sox. As mandated by Congress, the SEC 
planned on treating foreign firms in the same manner as it treats domestic firms. During the 
implementation, however, the SEC realized that in some instances it was impossible for 
some foreign firms to comply with both the laws of their home country and the terms of Sox. 
Over time, the SEC has had to provide non-U.S. firms certain accommodations to take into 
account foreign laws and regulations. For example, the SEC now allows non-management 
employees to serve as audit committee members. It also lets shareholders select or ratify the 
selection of auditors, and permits foreign government representation and controlling 
shareholder nonvoting representation on audit committees. Cross-listed companies availing 
themselves of those accommodations must disclose their reliance on the accommodations 
and their assessment of how such reliance might materially affect the ability of their audit 
committee to act independently. In terms of maintaining the attractiveness and 
competitiveness of U.S. stock exchanges to foreign companies, most do not believe that the 
SEC has gone far enough in accommodating non-U.S. firms under Sox. Table 3 summarizes 
the effective dates of implementing certain sections of Sox for Level II and Level III ADRs, 
and Table 3 lists the provisions as well as effective compliance dates of Sox.
9  
    The implementation of Sox has produced mixed results. Berger et al. (2005) 
found a variety of positive effects. Others such as Asthana et al. (2004) and Zhang (2005) 
found some negative effects. Berger et al. (2005) compared returns to cross-listed foreign 
companies to returns to US issuers. This lets them evaluate cross sectional variation in 
reaction based on home-country characteristics, but they cannot assess overall investor 
reaction to Sox, because of a lack of a control group of companies to which Sox does not 
apply. Litvak (2007) found that both q and market-to-book ratios of level II and III ADRs 
declined significantly during 2002 relative to level I and IV ADRs and relative to non cross-
listed companies. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) studied the determinants and 
consequences of cross-listings on the New York and London stock exchanges from 1990 to 
                                                 
9 Current accommodations provided by the SEC to Level II and Level III ADRs are highlighted in the 
shaded cells of Table 3.   6
2005.
10  They found that there was a significant premium for U.S. exchange listings every 
year, the premium has not fallen significantly in recent years, it persists even when allowing 
for unobservable firm characteristics, there is a permanent premium in event time, and these 
benefits have not been seriously eroded by Sox. Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2007) studied 
firm’s decision to go private as an effect of Sox finding that the quarterly frequency of 
going-private transactions has increased after the passage of Sox, and abnormal returns 
surrounding both the passage of Sox and the going-private announcement are significantly 
related to proxies for the costs and benefits of Sox and the net benefits of being a public 
firm. Zhang (2007) argued that US firms experienced a statistically significant negative 
cumulative abnormal return around key Sox events.  
2.2. Costs to International Listing in the US, Hong Kong and Germany 
In this session, we describe the main costs to cross-listing in the three destination markets. 
In the US, American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) is the primary way for foreign firms to 
cross-list. It is a negotiable certificate that represents a foreign company’s public traded 
equity. Depositary Receipts are made when brokers purchase a company’s shares on the 
respective domestic home stock market followed by delivering it to the depositary’s local 
custodian bank, such as Goldman Sachs, Union Bank of California, State Street, etc. Those 
banks hold the foreign shares denominated in a foreign currency and issue the US shares 
denominated in US dollars. There are four levels of ADRs in the US. Each level represents 
a different degree of disclosure requirement and costs. Table 2 details the basic differences 
among the four and how Sox compliance affects them. Level 1 ADRs are traded exclusively 
as over-the-counter Pink Sheet issues. It does not have to abide by the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) reconciliation. However, level 1 ADRs have limited 
liquidity. Level 4 ADRs are private placements and also do not have to abide by GAAP 
reconciliation. Level 2 and 3 ADRs require full SEC disclosure with Form 20-F and are the 
most prestigious and costly type of listing. Level 2 and 3 ADRs have to abide with full Sox 
compliance. In order to list on the NYSE, the minimum and maximum Listing Fees 
applicable the first time an issuer lists a class of common shares are $150,000 and $250,000, 
                                                 
 
10 See also Bianconi and Tan (2008) for cross-sectional evidence of the US versus UK comparisons.    7
respectively, which amounts include the special charge of $37,500. Table 4 details listing 
fees for listing on the two major US markets. 
    In Hong Kong, the stock market is operated by the SEHK (Stock Exchange of 
Hong Kong). The SEHK is a wholly owned subsidiary of the HK Exchange. Securities 
transactions on the SEHK are executed by the Automatic Order Matching and Execution 
System (AMS). The Growth Enterprise Market (GEM), launched by the SEHK, serves as a 
conduit where emerging enterprises, which do not fulfill the profitability or track record 
requirements of the existing market of the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, can obtain a 
listing and increase capital. To cross-list in Hong Kong, firms can list either on the Main 
Board or with GEM. The disclosure requirements in Hong Kong are more flexible than in 
the US. Firms can abide by International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the Hong Kong 
Financial Reporting Standards
11. It is believed that IAS gives managers more discretion to 
do earning management than US GAAP. However, if a firms’ primary listing is not in Hong 
Kong, then they are allowed to abide by IAS, Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards, or 
US GAAP
12. The listing fee for both the Main Board and the GEM is detailed on Table 5.  
    In Germany, firms can cross-list on either the EU-regulated market or the Open 
market. A listing on the Regulated Market leads to the General Standard or its Prime 
Standard segment, while admission to trading on the Regulated Unofficial Market leads to 
the Open Market with its Entry Standard segment. Table 6 details listing fees and the 
transparency requirements of listing on either the regulated or unregulated market. The 
disclosure requirement for listing in Germany is compliance with IAS.
13  
    Generally speaking, the listing requirements for cross-listing in Hong Kong and 
Germany are less stringent than in the US. Another factor to consider are the listing costs. 
Entry fees for the U.S. are nearly three times the cost for listing in Germany, and nearly four 
times that of Hong Kong. Once the initial fixed cost is incurred, then there are the additional 
external costs brought on by Sox. For a foreign firm to choose to cross-list in the US, the 
                                                 
11 As detailed in Hong Kong listing rule 19.14 for overseas issuers. 
 
12 As detailed in Hong Kong listing rule 19.39 for overseas issuers. 
 
13 As detailed in the Germany Corporate Governance Code 7.1.1.   8
benefit from cross-listing must exceed the costs, both fixed and external. Holmstrom and 
Kaplan (2003) state that shareholders of firms that were well governed prior to Sox are less 
likely to receive significant Sox-related benefits, and thus that the costs may exceed the 
benefits for those firms.
14  
3. Data 
In the empirical analysis, the most important variable is q. By definition, q measures the 
valuation of firms, computed often as total value divided by total assets. In our analysis, 
following Doidge et al. (2004), we calculate the q as follows: 




tion Capitaliza Market Liability Total
Q Tobin
+
=    (1) 
where the denominator is the firm’s book value of total assets and the numerator is the 
firm’s book value of total liability plus its market capitalization. Market capitalization is 
computed as the firm’s common shares outstanding multiplied by its current market price. 
All financial information used above is obtained at the fiscal year-end from 1999 to 2004.
15  
    Besides the dummy variables for cross-listing, we also include several firm-level 
and country-level variables as controls. INDU_Q is the median of q of the selected firms in 
a certain industry, defined by a 2-digit SIC code. Twenty and Hundred are dummy variables 
used to represent firm size based on asset amounts. A value of 1 was given if a firm has 
more than $20 million in total assets and $100 million respectively. The independent 
variable Sox is the time variable used to represent the occurrence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
It is given a value of 1 for all firms in years 2002 to 2005. GDPG is the GDP growth rate of 
the firm’s source country differentiated by year, thus controlling for macroeconomic factors. 
Table 8 present the definition of variables. 
                                                 
14 See also Santos and Scheinkman (2001) for a model of competition among exchanges. 
 
15 Due to data constraints, this measure does not use the market value of debt in the numerator and uses 
total assets instead of replacement cost in the denominator, see e.g. Doidge et al (2004).   9
    The sample firms’ financial information comes from the WorldScope database 
(July 2000 – July 2005). This database keeps the financial information of more than 25,000 
public traded companies from over 60 countries around the world. It represents 
approximately 95% of global market capitalization. 
    We focus on the origin countries of firms that were cross-listed in the U.S., Hong 
Kong, and Germany. Firms that were domestically listed in the U.S., Hong Kong, and 
Germany were omitted. Firms from U.S., Hong Kong, or Germany that were cross-listed 
elsewhere were also omitted. Firms cross-listed on other exchanges not the U.S., Hong 
Kong, or German exchanges were also omitted. Firms from Canada, the Russian Federation, 
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, and other small islands were omitted. We concentrate on a 
sample of 31 countries in the world spread out over a six year period of time. Table 7 
presents the 31 countries of origin of firms and their frequency distribution. In 2000, there 
were a total of 10,767 firms in the 31 countries, 13,239 in 2001, 14,983 in 2002, 16,167 in 
2003, 17,053 in 2004, and 18,209 in 2005 and over a six year period amounting to 90,418 
data points. In order to reduce variations in the financial data from inflationary pressures, 
we converted total assets into similar dollar terms using 2005 as the base year. The 
conversion of the numbers was done via GDP deflator indicators found from the IMF 
database. Then, we exclude observations from the finance, insurance, and real estate 
industries by eliminating firms that have two-digit SIC code from 60 to 67. This is because 
the valuation ratios of financial institutions are usually not comparable to those of non-
financial firms. This leaves us with 8,835 in 2000, 11,501 in 2001, 12,401 in 2002, 13,369 
in 2003, 14,282 in 2004, 15,383 in 2005, and a total of 75,771 data points over a six year 
period of time.  
    We first compiled the firms that were only listed on their domestic exchanges. 
Once limiting for this factor, our data left us with 6,654 firms in 2000, 7,439 in 2001, 8,395 
in 2002, 9,738 in 2003, 10,778 in 2004, 11,881 in 2005, and resulting in 54,885 total firms. 
We obtained the firms cross-listed in the U.S. via the CompuStat World Database. The 
CompuStat database contains all financial information from foreign firms cross-listed in the 
U.S. since the 1950’s as well as de-listing information. We did not limit ourselves to any 
specific ADR, all four level ADRs were considered because we believe that all four levels   10
of ADRs are prone to some aspects of Sox regulation. After finding the names of the cross-
listed firms, we then matched names with the WorldScope Database in order to compile the 
financial information. If the firm’s name or financial data was not available, then the firm 
was omitted. In order to stay consistent, any new listings from a different foreign country 
over the six year period of time was also omitted. There were 260 cross-listed firms in the 
U.S. with financial information available, 210 in 2001, 190 in 2002, 176 in 2003, 155 in 
2004, and 144 in 2005 for a total of 1,139 data points over a six year period of time. 
Because we excluded firms that de-listed, we were thus able to eliminate the survivorship 
bias.  
    The firms cross-listed in Hong Kong and Germany were found via the Hang Seng 
index website for Hong Kong and the Dusseldorf and Frankfort exchange websites in 
Germany. We included the Dusseldorf exchange as well because it is a private exchange 
that deals in private issues. Due to the fact that we also included private ADRs, we also felt 
it necessary to include the Dusseldorf exchange. Private listings cross-listed on the Hong 
Kong Exchange were also included. After finding the names, we again matched said names 
with the WorldScope database in order to compile the financial information necessary. 
There were 29 cross-listed firms in Hong Kong in 2000, 38 in 2001, 53 in 2002, 70 in 2003, 
83 in 2004, 95 in 2005, amounting to a total of 368 data points over a six year period of 
time. In Germany, there were 130 cross-listed firms in 2000, 141 in 2001, 150 in 2002, 155 
in 2003, 152 in 2004, 149 in 2005, compiling a total of 877 data points over a six year 
period of time.   
    Data for the country-level variable GDP growth was obtained from the IMF 
website, the IMF world development indicator report. To reduce the weight of outliers, we 
follow La Porta et al (2002) and censor q at the 2
nd and 98
th percentiles by setting extreme 
values to the 2
nd and 98
th percentile values, respectively. The final data set was compiled of 
49,416 data points. Table 8 presents the variable definitions, Table 9 the summary statistics 
and the correlation matrix, where we note that the trend in cross-listings is negative in the 
US and Germany, but positive in Hong Kong.    11
4. Econometric Models and Empirical Results 
Table 10 reports the average q for firms over the six year period of time by four categories: 
not cross-listed; cross-listed in the US; cross-listed in Hong Kong; and cross-listed in 
Germany. It also presents the number of firms in each category by year. 
    The columns (1) report the number of firms that are cross-listed neither in the US, 
Hong Kong, or Germany, and their mean q by each year. The mean q varies widely across 
years, from a minimum of 0.42 in South Korea to a maximum of 41.4 in Finland. The 
columns (2) show the number of firms and the mean q for firms that cross-listed in the US. 
There are a total of 1139 data points for US cross-listed firms over a six year period of time. 
The proportion of firms that are listed in the US varies widely across 30 countries, from 2 
firms in Greece, to 53 firms from the Netherlands. It then shows the difference in q between 
the US cross-listed firms and the non cross-listed firms for each time period. The difference 
was positive for US cross-listed firms over the time periods between 2000 and 2003; 
however in 2004 and 2005 the mean difference in q was negative. 
    The columns (3) provides information about the number of firms and the mean q 
for firms cross-listed in Hong Kong, and also calculates the difference in q between the 
Hong Kong cross-listed firms and the non cross-listed firms for each time period. Here we 
have a total of 368 cross-listed firms in Hong Kong over a six year period of time. In Hong 
Kong, mainly China dominates the cross-listings with 343 firms over a six year period of 
time, while Singapore was next with 15 firms over a six year period of time. It then 
presented the difference between the cross-listed Hong Kong firms and the non cross-listed 
firms. Hong Kong cross-listed firms showed a negative difference in q between non cross-
listed firms for all six years. The columns (4) provide information about the number of 
firms, and the mean q for firms cross-listed in Germany. Also, it calculates the difference in 
q between the cross-listed firms in Germany and the non cross-listed firms for each time 
period. There are a total of 877 cross-listed firms in Germany over a six year period of time. 
In Germany, there were 2 and 3 firms from Venezuela and China respectively with a 
maximum of 71 firms cross-listed from the UK. It then shows the difference in q between   12
the cross-listed firms in Germany and non cross-listed firms for each time period where a 
discount emerges after 2002. 
    The evidence from Table 10 is that in Hong Kong the premium is negative, in 
Germany it becomes negative after 2001 and in the US after 2004.      
4.1 Dynamic Panel Regressions 
Our empirical models are used to predict the effects of Sox on the US and other global 
capital markets. We used an unbalanced dynamic panel where firms are counted only in one 
country of origin with a sample size becomes of the size 48,307. We also separate based 
upon cross-listing destination. We capture Sox’s effect on overall firm value, on cross-
listing, on US cross-listing, and potentially whether the increased corporate governance in 
the US could possibly have also affected other global exchange markets thus creating a 
contagion effect in Hong Kong and Germany destinations. We test those hypotheses using 
the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel methodology. The general model is given by 
 q it = β0 + β1 qit-1 +  β2 crossit + β3 Soxit + β4 crossit ä Soxit + β' Xit + at+ εit    (2) 
where i indexes the company and t indexes the year. Xit is a vector of controls which 
includes the industry q, growth of gdp, firm size, country, industry, sector and time trend 
effects. The main hypotheses refer to the signs and magnitudes of β3 and β2. Following 
Bianconi and Tan (2008), the variable INDU_Q is used to control for the growth 
opportunity in a certain industry. Each of them should have a positive coefficient. If the 
high valuation of a cross-listed firms is simply because they have better investment 
opportunities, controlling for growth opportunity in the regression should make the cross-
listing premium disappear. The variable GDPG is used to control for country 
macroeconomic factors. The coefficient to this variable is ambiguous as country’s growth 
opportunities are different among developed and developing countries. Size refers to the 
variables Twenty and Hundred, used to control for firm size and thus try to capture growth 
opportunity of the firm. Specification (2) refers to overall firm value its effect on valuation, 
we also condition on cross-listing destination.   13
    We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel estimation since we have a 
small number of years and a large number of firms. The method is based on GMM with first 
differences, and fixed effects are appropriately taken into account. The results for 
specifications (2) are shown in Tables 11 and 12. 
    Table 11 presents the results for the general case. First, Sarbanes-Oxley (Sox) has 
a negative effect on firm value throughout the alternative specifications (1)-(8). The order of 
magnitude of the effect is between -8% to -27% on the value of the firm, from q=1. The 
persistence of the value of the firm is moderate and about 25% for all specifications (1)-(8). 
Second, the cross-listing effect on the value of the firm is not generally significant, nor is 
the interaction between Sarbanes-Oxley and cross-listing. The cross-listing effect is 
negative and marginally significant, but the result is not robust to alternative controls. In 
columns (9)-(11), we separate cross-listing by destination and uses alternative specifications 
depending on controls.
16 The results regarding Sarbanes-Oxley remain unchanged. The 
effects of cross-listing show that the Asian market of Hong-Kong destination commanded a 
discount of about 20%, whereas the US and Germany destinations did not have any 
significant cross-listing effect. The persistence of the value of the firm is moderate and 
about 25% for specifications (9)-(11) as well.   
    Table 12-14 presents results conditional on cross-listing in one of the three 
destinations: US, Hong-Kong and Germany; thus capturing North America, Asia and 
Europe destinations. Table 12, columns (1)-(6) present the US destination case. The sample 
excludes all firms cross-listed in Hong-Kong and Germany. The results are very close to the 
general case in Table 11. Sarbanes-Oxley (Sox) has a negative effect on firm value 
throughout the alternative specifications (1)-(6) with order of magnitude between -8% to -
27% on the value of the firm, from q=1. The persistence of the value of the firm is moderate 
and about 25% for all specifications (1)-(6). The cross-listing effect for the US destination 
on the value of the firm is negative but not statistically significant. Table 13, columns (1)-(6) 
present the Hong Kong destination case. The sample excludes all firms cross-listed in the 
United States and Germany. Sarbanes-Oxley (Sox) has a negative effect on firm value 
                                                 
16 We dropped the interaction term in the remaining specifications because it was not significant and 
did not alter the main effects.   14
throughout the alternative specifications (1)-(6) with order of magnitude between -8% to -
27% on the value of the firm, from q=1. The persistence of the value of the firm is moderate 
and about 25% for all specifications (1)-(6). The cross-listing effect for the Hong Kong 
destination shows a statistically significant discount of about -20% to -26% on the value of 
the firm. Finally, table 14, columns (1)-(6) present the Germany destination case. The 
sample excludes all firms cross-listed in the United States and Hong-Kong. Sarbanes-Oxley 
(Sox) has a negative effect on firm value throughout the alternative specifications (1)-(6) 
with order of magnitude between -8% to -27% on the value of the firm, from q=1. The 
persistence of the value of the firm is moderate and about 25% for all specifications (1)-(6). 
The cross-listing effect for the Germany destination is positive but not statistically 
significant for any specification in this case. 
    The evidence from Tables 11-14 is that Sarbanes-Oxley has had a consistent 
negative impact on the market value of firms in this sample. Controlling for Sox makes 
identification of the cross-listing effect on firm's value difficult. The significant result is that 
Honk Kong commands a significant discount on the value of a firm cross-listing there, 
relative to firms that do not cross-list there. However, we do not identify a premium in the 
US or Germany in this sample.  
4.2 Treatment Effects 
It is possible that firms with higher market valuation self-select into cross-listing. Firms 
with higher market value may gain more benefits from cross-listing than the costs borne 
onto them through the added disclosure requirements. We apply treatment effect methods to 
avoid potential biases. In particular, we can think of Sox and other characteristics as a 
treatment for the firm’s cross-listing decision. Each firm has a valuation outcome with and 
without this treatment. We use two methods for treatment effects, the consistent two-step 
estimator and the propensity score method.
17 In both cases, the models consist of the 
following two equations: 
     c r o s s it = β0 + β3 Soxit + β' Xit + uit       ( 3 a )    
                                                 
17 See e.g. Greene (1997) and Wooldridge (2002).   15
     q it = β0 +  β1 crossit + β2 Soxit + y ' Zit + εit      (3b) 
where (3a) is the decision on the unobserved latent variable and (3b) is the valuation 
equation; X and Z are controls. In the two-step case, the valuation equation includes l 
which measures the extent to which unobserved factors that make cross-listing more likely 
to occur are associated with valuations. In the propensity score method, we estimate the 
decision equation using the panel and use the predicted propensity to cross-list as an 
instrument for cross-listing in the valuation equation. Tables 15-18 present the results for 
the general case and by destination.  
    Table 15 is the large sample. Columns (1)-(2) give the two-step method and (3)-
(4) the propensity score method. In the two-step method, the decision equation, column (1) 
shows a significant positive effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing. The coefficient on l 
is negative and statistically significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to cross-
listings when valuations are low. Column (2) shows the valuation equation and while 
Sarbanes-Oxley has the usual negative effect, cross-listing commands a statistically 
significant premium on valuations. In column (3), the significant positive effect of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing is noted and in the IV regression the effect on valuation is 
negative as expected. However, the cross-listing premium is negative and not statistically 
significant in this case. 
    Tables 16-18 present results conditional on cross-listing in one of the three 
destinations: US; Hong-Kong; and Germany; thus capturing North America, Asia and 
Europe destinations. Table 16, columns (1)-(4) present the US destination case. The sample 
excludes all firms cross-listed in Hong-Kong and Germany. The results are qualitatively 
close to the general case in Table 15. In the two-step method, the decision equation, column 
(1) shows a significant positive effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing. The coefficient on 
l is positive and marginally significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to cross-
listings when valuations are high in the US destination case. Column (2) shows the 
valuation equation with the usual negative effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and a statistically 
insignificant negative effect of cross-listing on valuations. In column (3), the significant 
positive effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing is noted and in the IV regression the   16
effect on valuation is negative as expected. The cross-listing premium is negative and not 
statistically significant in this case as well. Table 17, columns (1)-(4) present the Hong 
Kong destination case. The sample excludes all firms cross-listed in the US and Germany. 
In the two-step method, the decision equation, column (1), shows a significant negative 
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing in the Hong Kong destination. The coefficient on 
l is negative and significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to cross-listings when 
valuations are low in the Hong Kong destination case. Column (2) shows the valuation 
equation with the usual negative effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and a statistically insignificant 
positive effect of cross-listing on valuations. In column (3), there is a significant positive 
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing. In the IV regression, the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley 
on valuation is negative and significant and the cross-listing discount is also significant. 
Finally, Table 18, columns (1)-(4) present the Germany destination case. The sample 
excludes all firms cross-listed in the US and Hong Kong. In the two-step method, the 
decision equation, column (1), shows a marginally significant negative effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley on cross-listing in the Germany destination. The coefficient on l is positive and 
significant indicating that unobserved factors lead to cross-listings when valuations are high 
in the Germany destination case. Column (2) shows the valuation equation with the usual 
negative effect of Sarbanes-Oxley and a statistically significant negative effect of cross-
listing on valuations. In column (3), there is a marginally significant negative effect of 
Sarbanes-Oxley on cross-listing. In the IV regression, column (4), the effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley on valuation is negative and significant and a cross-listing discount which is also 
significant. 
    The evidence from treatment effects confirms that Sarbanes-Oxley impacted 
negatively on the value of firms. The effect on the cross-listing decision shows a positive 
effect on the US destination and a negative effect on the Germany destination; the effect on 
the Hong Kong destination is not robust across the two methods, hence inconclusive. 
However, the Hong Kong destination seems to attract cross-listing of firms with lower 
valuations relative to the US and Germany destination.      17
5. Summary and Conclusions 
The implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 has added on additional costs to 
doing business in the US. We would be lead to believe that better corporate governance 
should lead to better and safer investment opportunities.  
    The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence on the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and how it has affected firm value and cross-listing decisions worldwide using dynamic 
panel data methods and treatment effects methods. We presented empirical models using a 
sample of 31 countries where firms cross-listed in a major North-American, Asian and 
European market for the period 2000-2005. First, we find that Sarbanes-Oxley (Sox) has 
had a consistent negative impact on the market value of firms in this period. However, 
controlling for Sox makes identification of the cross-listing effect on firm's value difficult. 
The evidence from differences in means is that in Hong Kong the cross-listing premium is 
consistently negative in 2000-2005, in Germany it becomes negative after 2001 and in the 
US after 2004. The dynamic panels show that Honk Kong commands a significant discount 
on the value of a firm cross-listing there, relative to firms that do not cross-list there. 
However, we do not identify a cross-listing premium in the US or Germany destination in 
this sample. The evidence from treatment effects confirms that Sarbanes-Oxley impacted 
negatively on the value of firms. However, the effect of Sox on the cross-listing decision is 
positive in the US destination and negative in the Germany destination; and the Hong Kong 
destination seems to attract cross-listing of firms with lower valuations relative to the US 
and Germany destination. In terms of the cross-listing decision, the evidence is in favor of 
crowding in the market where the accounting standards are better, lending support to the 
signaling and bonding hypothesis of cross-listing choice. 
    This study also has some advantages and limitations. The small time and large 
cross-sectional dimensions make the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel methodology 
appropriate. On the other hand, we only included country and industry-level effects, but not 
firm level characteristics. A fruitful avenue for future research would be to expand the 
number of firms and origin and destination markets to better understand the cross-listing   18
decision of firms and the impact of regulatory frameworks on firm value and cross-listing 
premium.   19
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Table 1: Top 10 exchanges by total share trading value 
    ___________________________________________________________________ 
Exchange  USD Bn 2006  USD Bn 2005  % change in 
USD 




21,790 17,858  22.0  22.0 
2. NASDAQ 
 




7,572 5,678  33.4  30.5 
4. Tokio Stock 
Exchange 
5,823 4,482  29.9  36.4 
5. Euronext 
 
3,853 2,906  32.6  29.2 
6. Deutche 
Burse 




1,934 1,566  23.5  21.0 
8. Borsa 
Italiana 
1,592 1,294  23.0  20.5 
9. SWX Swiss 
Exchange 
1,396 974  43.5 43.2 
10. Korea 
Exchange 
1,342 1,211  10.9  3.2 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: World Federation Exchange 2006 Annual Report 
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Table 2: ADR reporting and regulatory requirements 
 
   ___________________________________________________ 
 




























































Source: Small and Zhu (2008). 
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Table 3: Effective Dates of Sox compliance regulation 
 
Section of Sox  Brief  Effective of Compliance Dates 
201 Nonaudit  services  Service  contracted on or after May 6, 
2003 
202  Audit committee administration of the 
auditor engagement 
Service contracted on or after May 6, 
2003 
203  Audit partner rotation  Service contracted on or after May 6, 
2003 
204  Auditor reports to the auditor 
committee 
March 31, 2003 
206  Auditor "cooling off" periods  March 31, 2003 
301  Audit committee responsibilities and 
independent director requirement 
July 31, 2005 
302 CEO/CFO  Certification  Certification due on or after August 
14, 2003 
303  Improper influence on audits  June 26, 2003 
304  Compensation forfeit  July 30, 2003 
306  Insider trades  March 31, 2003 
307 Attorney  responsibilities  Accommodations provided to foreign 
attorney 
401  Off-balance sheet transactions 
disclosures 
Fiscal year ending on or after June 15, 
2003 
401 Contractual  obligations  Fiscal year ending on or after 
December 15, 2003 
402  Loan prohibition  July 30, 2002 
403  Section 16 forms  Securities registered by a private 
issuer are exempt from section 16 
404 Internal  controls  Extended to the fiscal year ending on 
or after July 15, 2006 
406  Code of ethics  Fiscal year ending on or after June 15, 
2003 
407  Financial expert on audit committee  Fiscal year ending on or after June 15, 
2003 
806 and 1107  Whistleblower provisions  July 30, 2002 
906 CEO/CFO  certification  Certification due on or after August 
14, 2003 
 
Note: Shaded cells indicate accommodations provided by SEC.  
Source: Small and Zhu (2008). 
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Table 4: US Costs to Listing 




NYSE Pricing Schedule 
Number of Securities Issued  Fee Per 
Share 
Up to and including 75 million      $0.0048 
Over 75 million up to and including 
300 million 
    $0.00375 
Over 300 million       $0.0019 
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Table 5: Hong Kong Costs to Listing 
Main Board 
Monetary Value of Equity Securities to be Listed 
(HK$ million) 
Initial Listing Fee (HK$) 
Not 
exceeding: 
100     150,000 
   200    175,000 
   300                            200,000 
   400                            225,000 
   500                            250,000 
   750                            300,000 
   1,000                         350,000 
   1,500                         400,000 
   2,000                         450,000 
   2,500                         500,000 
   3,000                         550,000 
   4,000                         600,000 
   5,000                        600,000 
Over 5,000      650,000 
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) 
Monetary Value of Equity Securities to be Listed 
(HK$ million) 
Initial Listing Fee (HK$) 
Not 
exceeding: 
100   100,000 
                        1,000    150,000 
Over                1,000    200,000 
 
Source: Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
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Table 6: Germany’s transparency requirements and fees to cross-listing 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Three distinct levels of transparency: Early standard as first step to capital market 
 
Prime standard  Quarterly reports; Financial 
calendar; Analyst 
conference; English language 
 
Annual report and interim 
report in accordance with 
IFRS/IAS; Publications of 
director's dealings(1); Ad-
hoc disclosures; Reporting 







defined by EU law 
 
 





Annual report and interim 
report in accordance with 
national standards; Important 
company news; Corporate 
profile and financial 
calendar; Minimum legal 
requirements 
Adherence to insider 
rules(1); Market abuse(3); 
Rules on public offerings(1) 
 
 
EU unofficial market 
(1) Securities Trade Act 
(2) Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act 
(3) Investor Protection Act 
 
Fees: 




















Listed securities € 3,000
 
Admission to trading € 
2,500 
 
Listed securities € 3,000
 








€ 7,500  € 10,000  € 5,000 
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Table 7: Countries of Origin in the Sample 
 
  _______________________________________________ 
Country Freq.  Percent  Cum. 
ARGENTINA 260  0.53 0.53
AUSTRALIA 3,956  8.01 8.53
BELGIUM 518  1.05 9.58
BRAZIL 185  0.37 9.95
CHILE 671  1.36 11.31
CHINA 3,218  6.51 17.82
DENMARK 708  1.43 19.26
FINLAND 668  1.35 20.61
FRANCE 3,645  7.38 27.98
GREECE 1,230  2.49 30.47
HUNGARY 138  0.28 30.75
INDIA 1,236  2.5 33.25
IRELAND 268  0.54 33.8
ISRAEL 393  0.8 34.59
ITALY 828  1.68 36.27
JAPAN 10,047  20.33 56.6
KOREA 
(SOUTH)  3,090 6.25 62.85
LUXEMBOURG 64  0.13 62.98
MEXICO 541  1.09 64.08
NETHERLANDS 873  1.77 65.84
NEW ZEALAND  390  0.79 66.63
PHILIPPINES 457  0.92 67.56
PORTUGAL 286  0.58 68.14
SINGAPORE 1,864  3.77 71.91
SOUTH AFRICA  1,526  3.09 75
SPAIN 457  0.92 75.92
SWEDEN 1,363  2.76 78.68
SWITZERLAND 481  0.97 79.65
TAIWAN 2,700  5.46 85.12
UNITED 
KINGDOM 7,285  14.74 99.86
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The sum of firm’s book value of total liability and its market 
capitalization divided by the firm’s book value of total assets. 
 
Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in either the US, HK, or Germany 
and 0 otherwise 
 
Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in HK and 0 otherwise 
 
Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in US and 0 otherwise 
 
Takes the value of 1 if cross-listed in Germany and 0 otherwise 
 
Takes the value of 1 if firm listed or is still listed after imposition of 
Sox (2002). 
 
GDP growth rate of the source country corresponding to year 
 
Median of q of the selected firms in a certain industry. The industry is 
defined according to 2-digit SIC code. 
 
Takes a value of 1 if firm’s assets denominated in 2005 US dollars 
exceeds $20 million 
 
Takes a value of 1 if firm’s assets denominated in 2005 US dollars 
exceeds $100 million 
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Table 9: Summary statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  Variable   |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
           Q |     49416    1.797876    2.648082   .2276778   42.46558 
       Cross |     49416    .0451878    .2077179          0          1 
          HK |     49416     .007447    .0859748          0          1 
     GERMANY |     49416    .0177473    .1320329          0          1 
      TWENTY |     49416     .845637       .3613          0          1 
     HUNDRED |     49416    .5787194    .4937694          0          1 
         Sox |     49416    .7679092    .4221709          0          1 
      INDU_Q |     49416    1.191583    .1973073       .858       2.11 
        GDPG |     49416    3.142421    2.458475      -10.9       17.3 





Table 9: Correlation matrix 
 
             |        q    cross     hk     germany   us    twenty   hundred   sox   indu_q   gdpg     year 
           q |   1.0000 
       cross |   0.0129   1.0000 
          hk |  -0.0179   0.3982   1.0000 
     germany |   0.0076   0.6179  -0.0116   1.0000 
          us |   0.0230   0.6566  -0.0124  -0.0192   1.0000 
      twenty |  -0.1817   0.0746   0.0253   0.0413   0.0562   1.0000 
     hundred |  -0.1512   0.1343   0.0410   0.0790   0.0996   0.5008   1.0000 
         sox |  -0.0555   0.0504   0.0315  -0.0245   0.0785  -0.0802  -0.0959  1.0000   
      indu_q |   0.1640   0.0314  -0.0156   0.0187   0.0386  -0.2549  -0.2194  0.0755   1.000    
        gdpg |   0.0268   0.0140   0.1837  -0.0729  -0.0232   0.0299  -0.0096  0.0827  -0.0632  1.000 
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 Not  Cross-Listed 
(1) 
Cross-Listed in US 
(2) 





  Number  Mean q  Number   Mean q  Diff  Number Mean  q  Diff  Number Mean  q   Diff  Total 
2000 5241  2.24  264  3.91  1.67  29  .77  -1.47  130  3.17  .93  5664 
2001  5878  1.87  210  2.45 .58  38  1.18 -.69 141  2.49 .62  6267 
2002  7428  1.56  190  1.91 .35  53  1.03 -.53 150  1.52 -.04  7821 
2003  8367  1.47  176  1.85 .38  70  1.13 -.34 155  1.30 -.17  8768 
2004  9469  1.87  155  1.78 -.09  83  1.49 -.38 152  1.66 -.21  9859 
2005  10650  1.84  144  1.71 -.13  95  1.41 -.43 149  1.73 -.11  11038 
Average q    1.80    2.26  .46  1.16  -.63   1.97  .17   
Total  47033   1139    368     877     49417   33
Table 11 
General Model 
 Dependent  Variable:  q    
 (1) 
 





































Size --  --  --  --  y  y  y  y 
Industry q  --  --  --  --  y  y  y  y 
GDP 
Growth 
-- -- --  --  y  y  y  y 
Country --  --  --  --  --  --  y  y 




































2  203.9*** 
 
107.9*** 204.2*** 207.4*** 300.3*** 304.7*** 20E03*** 20E03*** 
AR(2) 
error z 
















Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged 
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Table 11 continued 
General Model 
 Dependent  Variable:  q 


























Size --  y  y 
Industry q  --  y  y 
GDP Growth  --  y  y 
Country --  --  y 
Trend --  --  y 













2  208.0*** 
 
303.4*** 20E03*** 




Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged Industry q;  
Growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP; Countries, time trend.  
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Table 12 
United States Destination 
 Dependent  Variable:  q   




















Size  -- -- y y y y 
Industry  q  -- -- y y y y 
GDP  Growth  -- -- y y y y 
Country  -- --  -- -- y y 




























2  196.7*** 
 
196.9*** 292.9*** 293.5*** 19E03***  20E03*** 





20,334 20,334 20,334 20,334 
Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged 
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Table 13 
Hong Kong Destination 
 Dependent  Variable:  q   




















Size  -- -- y y y y 
Industry  q  -- -- y y y y 
GDP  Growth  -- -- y y y y 
Country  -- --  -- -- y y 




























2  191.0*** 
 
194.1*** 282.5*** 284.7*** 20E03***  20E03*** 





20,175 20,175 20,175 20,175 
Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged 
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Table 14 
Germany Destination 
 Dependent  Variable:  q   




















Size  -- -- y y y y 
Industry  q  -- -- y y y y 
GDP  Growth  -- -- y y y y 
Country  -- --  -- -- y y 




























2  198.8*** 
 
198.8*** 289.3*** 289.3*** 21E03***  21E03*** 





20,442 20,442 20,442 20,442 
Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged 
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Table 15 
















































Size y  y  y  y 
Industry q  y  y  y  y 
GDP Growth  y  y  y  y 









l  -0.374** 
(0.176) 
-- --  -- 
χ





F-test first stage  -- --  --  64.8*** 
R









Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged  
Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP  
(Lagged Industry q and growth of GDP excluded in Two-step case). 
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Table 16 
















































Size y  y  y  y 
Industry q  y  y  y  y 
GDP Growth  y  y  y  y 









l  0.411* 
(0.248) 
-- --  -- 
χ





F-test first stage  -- --  --  82.2*** 
R









Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged  
Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP, Time trend.  
(Lagged Industry q and growth of GDP excluded in Two-step case). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001, robust. 
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Table 17 
















































Size y  y  y  y 
Industry q  --  y  y  y 
GDP Growth  y  y  y  y 
Trend --  --  --  -- 






l  -0.243** 
(0.106) 
-- --  -- 
χ
2  -- 7,975***  68.03*** 
 
1,226** 
F-test first stage  --   --  71.1*** 
R









Notes: (') No lagged controls included. 
Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged  
Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP  
(Lagged Industry q and growth of GDP excluded in Two-step case). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001, robust. 
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Table 18 
















































Size y  y  y  y 
Industry q  y  y  y  y 
GDP Growth  y  y  y  y 
Trend --  --  y  y 






l  0.697*** 
(0.229) 
-- --  -- 
χ
2  -- 15,423***  455.8*** 
 
887.5*** 
F-test first stage  --   --  14.3*** 
R









Notes: Controls: Size =Twenty, Hundred; Industry q, lagged  
Industry q; Growth of GDP, lagged growth of GDP  
(Lagged Industry q and growth of GDP excluded in Two-step case). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001, robust. 
 
 
 
 